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INTRODUCTION 
On June 20, 2014, the Massachusetts Division of Insurance (“the 
Division”) issued Bulletin 2014-03 (“the Bulletin”), entitled “Guidance 
Regarding Prohibited Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or 
Gender Dysphoria Including Medically Necessary Transgender Surgery and 
Related Health Care Services.”1 As set forth in the Bulletin, the Division 
concluded that the denial of coverage by health insurance companies for 
                                                          
* Robert A. Whitney is a consultant with over twenty-five years of 
experience in the insurance and reinsurance industry. He was Deputy 
Commissioner and General Counsel at the Massachusetts Division of 
Insurance from September 2011 through October 2015.  All the views 
expressed herein are solely those of the author. 
1 COMMW. OF MASS, OFFICE OF AFF. & BUS. REG, BULLETIN 2014-03 
(June 20, 2014), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/11/21/bulletin 
%202014-03%20%28Gender%20Signed%29.pdf. 
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gender transition-related medical care including gender assignment surgery, 
hormone replacement therapy, and other treatments based on an individual’s 
gender identity or gender dysphoria was sex discrimination and prohibited 
under Massachusetts law.2 
In issuing the Bulletin, the Division also concluded that the nearly 
uniform exclusion of coverage for gender identity or gender dysphoria-
related treatment by Massachusetts health plans is considered prohibited sex 
discrimination because it would be a limitation on coverage based on the sex 
of the insured. As a result, the Division determined that any health care 
services that are ordinarily or exclusively available to individuals of one sex 
may not be denied based on the perceived gender identity of a person when 
the denial or limitation is due only to the fact that the insured is enrolled as 
belonging to the other sex, or has undergone, or is in the process of 
undergoing, gender transition.3 
The Division also concluded that although a carrier may exclude 
coverage for a particular condition or treatment to the extent allowed by law, 
the insurer may not base such exclusion on gender identity or gender 
dysphoria. In this regard, the Division concluded that a carrier may not 
discriminate on the basis of an insured’s or prospective insured’s actual or 
perceived gender identity, sex stereotyping, or on the basis that the insured 
or prospective insured is a transgender person.4 
On the same day that the Bulletin was issued, the administration of 
Governor Deval Patrick also announced that MassHealth, the Massachusetts 
Medicaid program, would cover gender re-assignment surgery as a standard 
benefit in its government health plan for lower-income persons and persons 
with disabilities.5  As reported by the Boston Globe at the time, the advocacy 
group Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) described these 
                                                          
2 Gender dysphoria is the official diagnosis of individuals who view 
themselves as being different from their assigned birth sex. The term is often 
used to describe persons who experience significant dysphoria with respect 
to their gender identity, which is described as a feeling of acute hopelessness 
and discontentment with their own biological sex. See American Psychiatric 
Association, Gender Dysphoria (2013), http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default 
.aspx. 
3 See supra note 1, at 1. 
4 See id. 
5 See Press Release, “Governor Announces Changes in Health Insurance 
Access for Transgender Community,” MassEquality, June 20, 2014, 
http://www.massequality.org/content/governor-announces-changes-health-
insurance-access-transgender-community. 
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two pronouncements as “historic” because at the time no other state had 
“announced in one fell swoop and this comprehensively, that medical care 
for transgender people is essential.”6 
The determination by the Division that exclusions from health 
insurance coverage for gender transition-related medical care would no 
longer be permitted in Massachusetts was the culmination of an almost six-
month review process by the Division where, at the time, I was the Deputy 
Commissioner and General Counsel. This Article explores how the Division 
reviewed the state of the law at the time, both on the federal and state level, 
to see if the strong prohibition in Massachusetts against discrimination under 
law also extended to prohibiting discrimination in healthcare coverage on the 
basis of gender identity or gender dysphoria. 
I. THE INITIAL REVIEW PROCESS 
In late 2013 and early 2014, advocacy groups such as GLAD and 
Health Law Advocates approached the Division asking it to declare that 
Massachusetts law precluded the exclusion of gender transition-related care 
from private insurance coverage, and that such exclusion was unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or gender dysphoria. At the 
time, the majority of health insurers in Massachusetts that were subject to 
regulation by the Division excluded from their medical plans coverage of 
medical treatment for persons with gender dysphoria.7 
In response to the requests from advocacy groups and individuals 
who were denied coverage under their Massachusetts health plans for gender 
transition-related medical care, including gender assignment surgery, 
hormone replacement therapy and other treatments, the Division began to 
                                                          
6 See Jeremy Fox, Mass. to Cover Range of Transgender Medical Care, 
BOSTON GLOBE (June 20, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014 
/06/20/state-cover-gender-reassignment-surgery-and-hormone-treatment-
for-transgender-patients/a9OPrvqdUPmRoiAQugVwEO/story.html. 
7 Gender dysphoria is the official diagnosis of individuals who view 
themselves as being different from their assigned birth sex. The term was 
often used to describe persons who experience significant dysphoria with 
respect to their gender identity, which is described as a feeling of acute 
hopelessness and discontentment with their own biological sex. See AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS, GENDER DYSPHORIA (5th ed. 2013). 
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review Massachusetts’ own laws, as well as federal law and the law of other 
states, to determine whether health insurance carriers should be prohibited 
from excluding from coverage medical treatment related to gender 
dysphoria.8 
As an initial matter, the Division looked to see whether there was 
any specific law in Massachusetts that would preclude such exclusions from 
being enforceable because of the insured’s gender identity alone. For 
example, on November 23, 2011, Governor Deval Patrick signed into law 
Chapter 199 of the Acts of 2011, entitled “An Act Relative to Gender 
Identity” (“Chapter 199”).9  This law added “gender identity” as a new 
protected characteristic under Massachusetts’ employment, housing, credit, 
public education anti-discrimination laws and to Massachusetts’ hate crimes 
law. All of these laws also protected several other characteristics, including 
sexual orientation, disability, sex, age, race, ancestry and religion. The law 
went into effect on July 1, 2012. 
Chapter 199 defines “gender identity” as “a person’s gender-related 
identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity 
or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s 
physiology or assigned sex at birth.”10  The law allows a person to 
demonstrate his/her gender identity by providing evidence including: 
medical history; care or treatment of the gender identity; consistent and 
uniform assertion of the gender identity; or any other evidence that the 
gender identity is sincerely held as part of a person’s core identity.”11 
                                                          
8 This was not the first time that the Division had examined whether 
insurance carriers were acting in a discriminatory manner with respect to 
coverage under their insurance policies. In 1988, the Commissioner of 
Insurance had issued regulations prohibiting a life insurer from considering 
gender-based mortality differences in the underwriting of life insurance, and 
which provided that "[n]o policy...shall, on the basis of...sex...treat any 
covered person...differently than it treats or would treat any other covered 
person...." 211 CODE MASS. REGS. § 35.04 (2) (1987). In Telles v. 
Commissioner of Insurance, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
Commissioner “lacked either express or implied authority to promulgate the 
regulations,” and that “the regulations at issue directly conflict with several 
of the statutes which regulate insurance practices.”  The Court concluded that 
the regulations were “void because the commissioner lacked authority to 
issue the regulations.  See 401 Mass. 560, 565-566 (1991). 
9 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 199 (2011). 
10 Id. at § 1. 
11 Id. 
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Chapter 199, while formally amending various laws precluding 
discrimination in employment, housing and other areas on the basis of one’s 
“gender identity,” specifically did not amend any laws covering 
discrimination in the areas of health insurance law. At that time, however, 
several other states had amended their respective insurance laws to 
specifically preclude discrimination in health insurance on account of a 
person’s gender identity or because of a person’s gender dysphoria.  
For example, in California, the regulations governing health 
insurance companies had been specifically amended to require that an 
admitted health insurer could not “discriminate on the basis of an insured’s 
or prospective insured’s gender identity, or on the basis that the insured or 
prospective insured is a transgender person.”12 
The discrimination prohibited by California regulation includes 
“[d]enying, cancelling, limiting or refusing to issue or renew an insurance 
policy on the basis of an insured’s or prospective insured’s actual or 
perceived gender identity, or for the reason that the insured or prospective 
insured is a transgender person.”13 
In addition, the California regulation prohibits health carriers from: 
[d]enying or limiting coverage, or denying a claim, for 
services…due to an insured’s actual or perceived gender identity or 
for the reason that the insured is a transgender person [including]: 
(1) Health care services related to gender transition if coverage is 
available for those services under the policy when the services are 
not related to gender transition, including but not limited to hormone 
therapy, hysterectomy, mastectomy, and vocal training; or (2) Any 
health care services that are ordinarily or exclusively available to 
individuals of one sex when the denial or limitation is due only to 
the fact that the insured is enrolled as belonging to the other sex or 
has undergone, or is in the process of undergoing, gender 
transition.14 
                                                          
12 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2561.2 (2012). 
13 Id. at § 2561.2(a)(1). 
14 Id. at § 2561.2(a)(4)(A) - (B). 
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In Oregon, the Insurance Division of the Department of Consumer 
and Business Services issued Bulletin INS 2012-01 in 2012.15 This bulletin  
stated that a health insurer in the state cannot discriminate in providing 
coverage on the basis of an insured’s or prospective insured’s gender identity 
or gender dysphoria.16 The Oregon Insurance Division stated that the bulletin 
was designed to provide guidance to health insurers about how to conform 
to provisions of the Oregon Equality Act of 2007, in which “sexual 
orientation” is defined to include an individual’s actual or perceived gender 
identity, “regardless of whether the individual’s gender identity, appearance, 
expression or behavior differs from that traditionally associated with the 
individual’s sex at birth.”17 
The Oregon Insurance Division noted that because the Oregon 
insurance code already prohibited discrimination in the provision of health 
insurance coverage on the basis of “sexual orientation,” health carriers could 
not deny or limit coverage or deny a claim for a procedure provided for 
gender identity or gender dysphoria if the same procedure were allowed in 
the treatment of another medical condition.18 Although a health insurer could 
categorically exclude coverage for a particular condition or treatment, the 
insurer could not base such exclusion on gender identity.19  
In Vermont, the Department of Financial Regulation, Division of 
Insurance issued Insurance Bulletin No. 174 in 2013, which provides that 
notice to insurers that health care plans could not exclude coverage for 
medically necessary services for transgender people, including gender 
reassignment surgeries.20  The bulletin rested specifically on the 2007 
Vermont law, Act 41, which specifically prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of “gender identity.”21  The bulletin noted that the law prohibiting 
gender identity discrimination applied to insurance companies, and as such, 
effective January 1, 2014, the Vermont Division of Insurance precluded 
                                                          
15 See OR. INS. DIVISION, Bulletin INS 2012-01 (Dec. 19, 2012) 
https://dfr.oregon.gov/laws-rules/Documents/Bulletins/bulletin2012-01.pdf. 
[hereinafter Bulletin 2012-01]. 
16 Id. at 1. 
17 See id., citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.100. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id. at 3-4. 
20 VT. D.F.R., DIVISION OF INS., Ins. Bulletin No. 174 (Apr. 22, 2013), 
https://dfr.vermont.gov/sites/finreg/files/regbul/dfr-bulletin-insurance-174 
.pdf. [hereinafter Bulletin No. 174] 
21 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 144 (2007). 
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health insurers from excluding from coverage care related to gender 
transition.22  
Unlike in these other states, however, the 2011 law in  
Massachusetts, Chapter 199 only precluded discrimination in employment, 
housing and other areas on the basis of one’s “gender identity;” it did not 
explicitly extend to precluding the exclusion of gender transition-related 
medical care from health insurance policies.23  As such, the Division 
determined that it needed to look elsewhere to see if there was any other basis 
in Massachusetts law or court decisions for disallowing such exclusions. 
During the time period when the Division was conduction its review, 
a new decision was handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts concerning issues related to gender dysphoria. In Kosilek 
v. Spencer,24 the District Court had held that a prisoner’s gender identity 
disorder constituted a serious medical need that triggered Eighth 
Amendment protection.25  In making its decision, the District Court was 
presented with testimony from Department of Correction (“DOC”) 
physicians, who testified that “Kosilek is now suffering a degree of mental 
anguish that itself constitutes a serious harm that requires adequate 
treatment.”26 
                                                          
22 Bulletin No. 174, supra note 20. 
23 Chapter 199 amended various chapters of the Massachusetts General 
Laws, but none related to insurance. See e.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 199 § 1. 
24 889 F. Supp.2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012) aff'd, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 
2014), reh'g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn (Feb. 12, 2014), on reh'g 
en banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), and rev'd, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
25 Id. The decision was initially affirmed by the First Circuit, but on 
February 12, 2014, the First Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc and 
withdrew their initial opinion. 
26 See id. at 229.  While the court in Kosilek used the term “gender 
identity disorder,” the American Psychiatric Association changed the term 
“gender identity disorder” to “gender dysphoria” in the then latest version of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”)—DSM 
V—in December 2012, in order to “respect the individuals identified by 
offering a diagnostic name that is more appropriate to the symptoms and 
behaviors they experience without jeopardizing their access to effective 
treatment options.”  See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Gender Dysphoria (2013), 
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/citations/Gender%20Dysphori
a%20Fact%20Sheet%202.pdf. The terms “gender dysphoria,” “gender 
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The District Court in Kosilek ordered the DOC to provide the means 
for Kosilek to undergo gender reassignment surgery. In making its ruling the 
court relied on the fact that “[a]ll of the doctors who testified at trial, except 
for [one], provided evidence that sex reassignment surgery for Kosilek is 
both medically necessary and the only adequate treatment for his severe 
gender identity disorder.”27 Without such surgery, the court found Kosilek 
was at a high risk of further attempts at suicide.28 
The Kosilek court, however, limited its holding to the prison context, 
and noted that the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment imposes certain 
duties on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.29  The District Court cited 
to the Supreme Court’s view on a state’s duties to prisoners under the Eighth 
Amendment: “[t]o incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to 
provide for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the state for food, 
clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison’s failure to provide 
sustenance for inmates may actually produce physical torture or a lingering 
death.”30 
Ultimately, however, the Division did not find that the Kosilek 
court’s determination, which was based on the court’s conclusion that the 
Department of Corrections had violated the Constitution’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment, was instructive in answering the question as 
                                                          
identity disorder,” and “transsexualism” were often used interchangeably by 
courts.  See e.g., South v. Gomez, No. CV-95-01070-DFL at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 
25 2000) (Westlaw) (noting that “gender dysphoria [is] more commonly 
known as transsexualism”); see also Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 
1290 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 2010) aff’d 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[Gender 
identity disorder (GID)] and transsexualism are closely related and are 
sometimes used as synonyms….”).   
27 See Kosilek, 889 F.Supp. 2d at 233. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 203. The District Court noted that “a prison official acts with 
deliberate indifference and violates the Eighth Amendment if, knowing of a 
real risk of serious harm, she denies adequate treatment for a serious medical 
need for a reason that is not rooted in the duties to manage a prison safely 
and to provide the basic necessities of life in a civilized society for the 
prisoners in her custody.” 
30 See id. at 198, citing Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
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to whether a private insurance carrier would violate Massachusetts law when 
the carrier excluded coverage for gender transition-related treatment.31 
Therefore, the Division began to explore whether there was any 
other basis in federal and state law for prohibiting health insurance carriers 
from excluding from coverage medical treatment for persons with gender 
dysphoria. 
II. MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 
One area that the Division examined was whether the exclusion of 
gender transition-related medical care from health insurance policies in 
Massachusetts might amount to unlawful discrimination based on a person’s 
mental health under the Massachusetts mental health parity law.32  The 
Massachusetts mental health parity law required that insurance plans cover 
mental health benefits on a non-discriminatory basis for the medically 
necessary treatment of any “mental disorder” listed in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”).33  The Massachusetts mental health parity law provides 
that: “[a]n individual policy of accident and sickness insurance… shall 
provide mental health benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis to residents of 
the commonwealth...for the diagnosis and medically necessary and active 
treatment of any mental disorder, as described in the most recent edition of 
the DSM, that is approved by the commissioner of mental health.”34 
The Division looked to the state of Connecticut, where the 
Connecticut Division of Insurance in 2013 in its Bulletin IC-34, relied upon 
the state’s mental health parity statute as the basis for concluding that the 
exclusion of gender transition-related medical care from health insurance 
                                                          
31 See id. at 205. The Kosilek court’s finding that a prisoner completely 
relied on the state for medical care was a key rationale supporting the Court’s 
decision that by not treating a prisoner for her gender dysphoria, the state 
had violated the Constitution. As the District Court noted, it “has long been 
well-established that it is cruel for prison officials to permit an inmate to 
suffer unnecessarily from a serious medical need. It is unusual to treat a 
prisoner suffering severely from a gender identity disorder differently than 
the numerous inmates suffering from more familiar forms of mental illness.” 
32 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 47B (a) (2015). 
33 Id. 
34 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (a). 
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policies in Connecticut was impermissible.35 The Connecticut mental health 
parity statute provides that “[e]ach individual health insurance policy…shall 
provide benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of mental or nervous 
conditions.”36  The Connecticut bulletin further stated that the Connecticut 
mental health parity statute,37 in conjunction with the Connecticut group 
health insurance statute, together “require health insurers to pay ‘covered 
expenses’ for treatment provided to individuals with gender dysphoria where 
treatment is deemed necessary under generally accepted medical 
standards.”38   
The language in the Connecticut mental health parity statute mirrors 
that in the Massachusetts statute, which prohibits an insurer from 
“provid[ing] mental health benefits on a discriminatory basis to residents of 
the commonwealth...for the diagnosis and medically necessary and active 
treatment of any mental disorder, as described in the most recent edition of 
the DSM, that is approved by the commissioner of mental health.”39  
Therefore, at the time, the Division considered whether perhaps under 
Massachusetts mental health parity law, as in Connecticut, an argument 
could be made that if an individual is diagnosed with gender dysphoria, as 
recognized in the latest DSM as a “mental disorder,” an insurer could be 
prohibited from limiting or withholding coverage for medically necessary 
treatment, where the insurer would provide the same treatment to individuals 
who require it for a different medically necessary reason. 
The Division ultimately concluded that it would not rely on the 
Massachusetts mental health parity laws as the basis for concluding that the 
exclusion of gender transition-related medical care from health insurance 
policies in the state was not permissible because of the continued debate 
within the activist community as to whether being a transgender person was 
a “mental disorder” at all.  
As noted above, in December 2012, the American Psychiatric 
Association announced that it approved changes in its official manual for 
classifying mental illnesses, known as DSM-5, formally eliminating the term 
“gender identity disorder,” and replacing it with the term “gender 
                                                          
35 See CONN. DIV. INS., Bulletin IC-34 (Dec. 19, 2013), https://portal.ct. 
gov/-/media/CID/BulletinIC37GenderIdentityNondiscriminationRequireme 
ntspdf.pdf?la=en. 
36 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-488a (b) (2013). 
37 Id. 
38 See Bulletin IC-34 at 1. 
39 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B(a). 
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dysphoria.”40  The term “gender identity disorder” had been long considered 
stigmatizing by mental health specialists and lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender activists.41  “Gender dysphoria” instead focuses the attention on 
only those who feel distressed by their gender identity.42  At the time of the 
change in terms in the DSM-5, there had been calls by activists to remove 
the diagnosis altogether just as homosexuality had been removed from the 
DSM in 1973, but gender dysphoria was ultimately left as a diagnosis to 
ensure that a transgender person could still access health care if needed.43   
While many transgender activists felt that the gender dysphoria 
diagnosis remains a “powerful legal tool” when challenging discrimination 
in health insurance plans and services, other activists disagreed, stating that 
the new DSM criteria did not go nearly far enough in clarifying that 
“nonconformity to birth-assigned roles and victimization from societal 
prejudice do not constitute mental pathology,” and that being a transgender 
person was not a mental disorder.44  The advocacy organization GLAAD 
noted similar concerns at the time, stating that: 
Some transgender advocates see this approved change in the DSM-
V as an important step toward removing stigma against transgender 
people based on false stereotypes about gender identity and 
expression, as well as the word “disorder.” Transgender people may 
no longer be subject to a lifelong default diagnosis of their mental 
health…. However, other transgender advocates note the barriers 
this change may create to accessing trans-related medical care, 
which could already be difficult to access and prohibitively 
expensive even before the change.45 
                                                          
40 Supra note 26. 
41 See Moni Basu, Being Transgender No Longer a Mental 'Disorder' in 
Diagnostic Manual, CNN (Dec. 27, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://inamerica.blogs 
.cnn.com/2012/12/27/being-transgender-no-longer-a-mental-disorder-in-dia 
gnostic-manual/ (“CNN Report”). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See Dani Heffernan, The APA Removes “Gender Identity Disorder” 
from Updated Mental Health Guide, GLAAD (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www. 
glaad.org/blog/apa-removes-gender-identity-disorder-updated-mental-healt 
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Therefore, while the Connecticut Insurance Department relied upon 
its mental health parity law to establish the principle that excluding coverage 
treating gender dysphoria would be a parity violation, this conclusion 
necessitated a finding that gender dysphoria was a major mental disorder 
subject to a mental health parity analysis. The Division, however, did not 
believe that it was appropriate to reach a similar conclusion, because there 
was no strong consensus in favor of this position in the transgender 
community in Massachusetts, and  there were many transgender persons who 
strongly believed that being transgender was not a mental disorder or 
pathology. As such, the Division concluded that it could not rely upon 
Massachusetts mental health parity law to preclude carriers from excluding 
coverage for treating gender dysphoria. 
III. UNFAIR INSURANCE PRACTICE 
The Division next looked to whether excluding coverage for gender 
transition-related medical treatment from people with gender dysphoria 
violated Massachusetts unfair insurance practices law. In Massachusetts, 
unfair insurance practices governed under Massachusetts General Law 
Chapter (“Chapter”) 176D are considered the “making or permitting any 
unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and of essentially 
the same hazard in the amount of premium, policy fees, or rates charged for 
any policy or contract of accident or health insurance or in the benefits 
payable thereunder, or in any of the terms or conditions of such contract, or 
in any other manner whatever.”46 
Thus, the argument for applying this law to the coverage issue at 
hand was that Chapter 176D, § 3(7)(b) would be applicable to individuals 
who require treatment for gender dysphoria because they are of the same 
class and of essentially the same hazard as individuals who require the same 
treatment for a different medically necessary reason. The first issue that was 
looked at was whether the two groups were of the “same class.” The 
Massachusetts statute, however, does not define “class.” 
In Life Insurance Association of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of 
Insurance,47  the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down a 
Division of Insurance regulation which prohibited underwriting practices of 
insurers regarding the testing of prospective insureds for exposure to HIV. 
The Court noted that the “basic principle underlying statutes [like Chapter 
                                                          
h-Guide. 
46 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 176D, § 3(7)(b) (West 2012). 
47 530 N.E.2d 168 (1988).   
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176D § 3]…is that insurers have the right to classify risks and to elect not to 
insure risks if the discrimination is fair.”48 
The Court also noted that the intended result of the process is that 
persons of substantially the same risk will be grouped together, paying the 
same premiums, and will not be subsidizing insureds who present a 
significantly greater hazard. The Court found that insurers, under Chapter 
176D § 3, have a general right to discriminate fairly. The Court also noted: 
“[i]t is not seriously denied that persons who have HIV antibodies, as a 
group, are at greater risk of illness and have shorter life expectancies than 
those who do not have HIV antibodies.”49  The Court’s ruling indicates that 
it did not consider persons who present greater risks to the insurer 
(individuals with HIV) to be in the “same class” as those who present lesser 
risks (individuals without HIV).  
The ruling in Life Ins. Ass’n of Massachusetts was reinforced by the 
SJC in Telles v. Commissioner of Insurance.50  The question in Telles was 
whether the Commissioner of Insurance could “lawfully issue regulations 
which prohibit life insurers from considering gender-based mortality 
differences in the underwriting of life insurance.”51  The Court noted that the 
Commissioner’s “unisex” regulation required individuals from different risk 
classes—males and females—to be grouped together. 
Relying on Life Ins. Ass’n of Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Telles found that requiring insurers to group men and women 
together, individuals typically in different risk classes, to be “in direct 
conflict” with Chapter 176D §3(7). In Telles, the Court held that the 
Commissioner of Insurance was without authority to promulgate regulations 
prohibiting life insurers from considering gender-based mortality differences 
in the underwriting of life insurance, insurers had the statutory right to 
classify risks. Thus, gender-based classifications for the determination of 
insurance rates were permitted under the statutory scheme. 
The Telles court read the “same class” language to mean that 
“insureds must be treated in accordance with their risk classification.”52 As 
such, the Telles court would likely interpret the “same class” language to 
mean “same risk classification,” and if two groups present different risks to 
                                                          
48 See id. at 171. 
49 See id. 
50 574 N.E.2d 359 (1991). 
51 Id. at 360. 
52 574 N.E.2d at 361. 
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the insured, the groups would be considered to be in different classes for 
purposes of Chapter 176D § 3. 
At the time, the Division noted that the holdings in Life Ins. Ass’n of 
Massachusetts and Telles might be distinguishable from the question of 
whether an insurer can exclude coverage for medically necessary treatment 
from individuals solely because they have gender dysphoria. Life Ins. Ass’n 
of Massachusetts and Telles dealt with individuals who were in different risk 
classifications: individuals with and without HIV; and men and women. An 
individual with gender dysphoria and an individual with cervical cancer may 
both require a hysterectomy as part of their medically necessary treatment, 
and as such, could be viewed as being in the same risk classification.  
The costs and risks these two groups present to the insurer would be 
the same—the cost of the hysterectomy, for example—even though the 
needs for the treatments have different causes. Since an individual with 
gender dysphoria would not necessarily be costlier than an individual who 
requires the same treatment for a different medically necessary reason, these 
two groups would likely be placed in the “same class,” and Life Ins. Ass’n of 
Massachusetts and Telles decisions would not necessarily prevent the 
Division from prohibiting discrimination between the two groups. Therefore, 
if an insurer denies coverage for a particular treatment only to individuals 
with gender dysphoria, but not to individuals who need the same medical 
treatment for a different reason, then the insurer might be in violation of 
Chapter 176D § 3. 
To interpret the term “same class” to include individuals with and 
without gender dysphoria would have aligned the Division with the approach 
taken by the state of Colorado. Colorado’s Division of Insurance treated 
individuals with and without gender dysphoria as belonging to the same class 
for purposes of the Colorado unfair insurance practices statute. The Colorado 
Division of Insurance issued a bulletin prohibiting discrimination against 
individuals with gender dysphoria based, in part, on their counterpart to the 
Massachusetts unfair insurance practices law.53 
                                                          
53 See COLO. DIV. INS., BULL. NO. B-4.49, INSURANCE UNFAIR 
PRACTICES ACT PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION (2013), http://www.one-colorado.org/wp-content/uploads/20 
13/03/B-4.49.pdf. As noted in the bulletin, Colorado law defined “sexual 
orientation” as “a person’s orientation toward heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status or another person’s 
perception thereof” and such definition applied to every statute, including 
the unfair insurance practices law. 
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The Colorado unfair insurance practices law prohibits any unfair 
discrimination “between individuals of the same class…in the amount of 
premium, policy fees, or rates charged for any policy of sickness and 
accident insurance, in the benefits payable under such policy, in the terms or 
conditions of the policy, or in any other manner.”54  Although nothing in the 
Colorado Bulletin expressly states so, it appears likely that Colorado would 
consider individuals—with and without gender dysphoria—who require the 
same medically necessary treatment to be individuals of the “same class and 
of essentially the same hazard.”55 
Similarly, the D.C.’s Department of Insurance, Securities and 
Banking issued two bulletins in 2013 and 2014 respectively that prohibited 
gender identity discrimination. These bulletins were based on the District’s 
Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act, which prohibited discrimination in 
health insurance based on gender identity or expression.56 In its bulletin 
issued on February 27, 2014 (“February 2014 Bulletin”) prohibiting 
discrimination against individuals with gender dysphoria, the Department of 
Insurance, Securities and Banking articulated the interpretation of “same 
class and of essentially the same hazard” language the same way as 
Colorado’s Division of Insurance. 
                                                          
54 See COLO. REV. STAT. 10-3-1104(1)(f)(XIII) (2018). 
55 In the case Cortez v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-99-
00846-CV (Sept. 13, 2001), the Texas Court of Appeals was looking at 
identical language contained in the Texas unfair insurance practices law, and 
concluded that the interpretation of “same class and of essentially the same 
hazard” language meant looking at the “treatment of the plaintiffs in 
comparison to other similarly situated individuals.” As such, it would be 
reasonable in Colorado to view individuals who require the same medically 
necessary treatment to be “similarly situated individuals.” 
56 See D.C. DEP’T OF INS., SEC. AND BANKING, BULL. NO. 13-IB-01-
30/15, PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE BASED ON 
GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION (2013), https://disb.dc.gov/publication/1 
3-ib-01-3015-prohibition-discrimination-health-insurance-based-gender-ide 
ntity-or; see also D.C. DEP’T OF INS., SEC. AND BANKING, BULL. NO. 13-IB-
01-30/15 Revised, PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH 
INSURANCE BASED ON GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION (2014), 
https://disb.dc.gov/publication/disb-bulletin-13-ib-01-3015-revised-prohibit 
ion-discrimination-health-insurance-based. 
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The D.C.’s February 2014 Bulletin cites the D.C.’s counterpart to 
the Massachusetts unfair competition in insurance statute, the District’s 
Code § 31-2231.11.57  The February 2014 Bulletin first clarifies that gender 
dysphoria is “a recognized medical condition under health insurance policies 
covering medical and hospital expenses, regardless of whether explicitly 
referenced.”58  Next, the February 2014 Bulletin noted the unfair competition 
statute applied to health insurance.59 
The District of Columbia’s unfair competition statute varies slightly 
from that of Massachusetts’ in that the statute expressly prohibits 
discrimination based on gender identity or expression. The District of 
Columbia’s February 2014 bulletin went on to state that “[t]he only 
interpretive question that remains… is whether gender dysphoria diagnosed 
individuals and non-gender dysphoria diagnosed individuals seeking health 
insurance are ‘of the same class and essentially the same hazard.’”60  
Because both sets of individuals were seeking coverage under the 
same health insurance policies offering benefits and services for recognized 
medical conditions, the District of Columbia’s Department of Insurance, 
Securities and Banking in the bulletin concluded that for purposes of § 31-
2231.11(b), the individuals were of the “same class” and “essentially the 
same hazard.”61 To come to the conclusion reached by the District of 
Columbia, it does not appear necessary to have express language prohibiting 
discrimination based on gender identity or expression contained within the 
unfair insurance practices law, but the express language served to bolster the 
analysis. By concluding that individuals with and without gender dysphoria 
are of “the same class and essentially the same hazard” the District of 
Columbia appeared to agree with the state of Colorado. 
Thus, the key issue for the Division in 2014 was whether it was 
reasonable to conclude that Massachusetts, like Colorado and the District of 
Columbia, would consider individuals with and without gender dysphoria 
who require medically necessary treatment to be individuals of the “same 
class and of essentially the same hazard.” Only if the two groups were treated 
as being in the same class and essentially the same hazard, would Chapter 
176D § 3 prohibit an insurer from “any unfair discrimination…in 
any…manner whatever” against individuals with gender dysphoria. 
                                                          
57 See D.C. CODE § 31-2231.11 (2012). 
58 See Bulletin 13-IB-01-30/15, Revised at 2. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
In early 2014, the Division also looked at whether health insurers 
that excluded coverage for people with gender dysphoria violated 
Massachusetts laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. At the time, Massachusetts law generally prohibited sexual 
orientation discrimination in the areas of employment, housing, public 
accommodations, credit and services, and education as well as insurance.62  
In the employment context, Massachusetts law unambiguously defined 
“sexual orientation” as including only “heterosexuality, bisexuality, or 
homosexuality.”63 There was no specific Massachusetts statute or regulation, 
that specifically defined sexual orientation as “gender identity” or gender 
dysphoria. 
Despite the lack of express statutory or regulatory authority to 
including individuals with gender dysphoria in the “sexual orientation” 
group, at least one Massachusetts court had issued an opinion that supported 
a broad interpretation of the meaning of “sexual orientation” discrimination. 
In 2002, in Lie v. Sky Publishing Corporation,64  the Massachusetts Superior 
Court found that those who transgress traditional gender roles and defy 
stereotypes associated with their biological sex are less likely to be perceived 
as heterosexual than the general population.65 
As a result, the court held that the conflation of one’s appearance 
with one’s sexual orientation might lead to discrimination actionable under 
Chapter 151B’s definition of sexual orientation discrimination.66  It did not 
appear at the time, however, that this interpretation was generally accepted 
in Massachusetts. Moreover, the court’s conclusion was at odds with the 
long-recognized differences between sexual orientation and gender identity, 
                                                          
62 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (2004). 
63 See ch. 151B, § 3(6) (2012).   
64 No. 013117J (Mass. Super. Ct, Oct. 7, 2002). 
65 Id. 
66 See Sky Publishing Corp., slip op. at 4, (citing Rosa v. Park West Bank 
& Trust, 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000)) (“It is...reasonable to infer...that 
[the teller] refused to give [the plaintiff] the loan application because she 
thought he was gay, confusing sexual orientation with cross-dressing”). 
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which lead to the conclusion that sexual orientation protections would not 
apply per se to protect individuals who were transgender.67 
V. SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Another argument that the Division considered in early 2014 to 
preclude health insurers from excluding individuals from coverage for 
certain medical treatments because they have gender dysphoria, was that 
such an exclusion violates federal and Massachusetts laws which prohibit 
discrimination based on sex. In the absence of statutory language that defined 
the term “sexual discrimination” in health insurance laws as specifically 
including discrimination based upon “gender identity,” whether the term 
“sex discrimination” extended to protect individuals with gender dysphoria 
depended on the scope given to the term. Under a broad interpretation of the 
term, “sex discrimination” could include discrimination based on gender 
non-conformance and applies to individuals with gender dysphoria, while a 
narrow interpretation of sex discrimination would limit the term to include 
only discrimination based on an individual’s biological sex. 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the term 
“sex discrimination” broadly in suits brought under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,68  a plurality of the Court 
addressed sex discrimination in a suit brought by a female partnership 
candidate in an accounting firm who alleged she was discriminated against 
for appearing too “macho.”69  In its ruling, the Court moved away from the 
traditional, limited view of sex discrimination and stated: “we are beyond the 
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n 
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
                                                          
67 See Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-
gender-identity-terminology-and-definitions (definiting “gender identity” as 
the “innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both or neither – 
how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves,” while 
“sexual orientation” is the “inherent or immutable enduring emotional, 
romantic or sexual attraction to other people”). 
68 See 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
69 See id. at 235. 
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of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”70  The Court concluded 
that the term “sex discrimination” could include discrimination against 
persons who fail to conform to gender stereotypes.71  
In Smith v. City of Salem Ohio,72  the Sixth Circuit relied on Price 
Waterhouse to expressly recognize a cause of action for a transgender person 
claiming protection under Title VII. The Smith case involved a city fire 
department employee, who was born biologically male and was diagnosed 
with gender identity disorder while working for the city fire department. 
After the city pressured the employee to submit to multiple psychiatric 
evaluations by doctors of their choosing, the employee brought a Title VII 
action alleging sex discrimination.73 
The Sixth Circuit noted that pre-Price Waterhouse federal courts 
routinely rejected expanding the definition of “sex” to include gender non-
conforming individuals, but that those cases had been “overruled by the logic 
and language” of Price Waterhouse. The court ultimately held that 
allegations of discrimination based upon the employee’s gender non-
conforming behavior and appearances were actionable pursuant to Title 
VII.74  Post Price Waterhouse and Smith, under Title VII, the term “sex” 
appeared to encompass both biological sex and the failure to conform to 
socially prescribed gender expectations. 
The First Circuit had similarly interpreted “sex discrimination” as 
being broad in scope. This is evident in the Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust 
Co.,75 decision. In that case, the court found that discrimination based on an 
individual’s habit of cross dressing may be considered sex discrimination. In 
Rosa, the First Circuit concluded that a biological male who presented and 
lived as a female may be able to establish a cause of action for sex 
discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), which 
prohibits discrimination with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on 
the basis of sex, where she was denied a loan application from a bank because 
of her feminine attire.76 
                                                          
70 See id. at 251 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
71 490 U.S. at 251. 
72 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
73 Id. at 568–70.   
74 Id. at 573-75, 578. 
75 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000). 
76 Id. at 215-16. 
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The court found it reasonable to infer that the Bank told “Rosa to go 
home and change because [the bank] thought that Rosa’s attire did not accord 
with his male gender: in other words, that Rosa did not receive the loan 
application because he was a man, whereas a similarly situated woman 
would have received the loan application.”77  The court cited the Supreme 
Court in Price Waterhouse to support the conclusion that “stereotyped 
remarks [including statements about dressing more ‘femininely’] can 
certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in the discrimination.78 
The broad interpretation of “sex discrimination” had also been 
extended to cases where the discrimination was based on an employee’s 
perceived homosexuality. In Centola v. Potter,79  the U.S. District Court in 
Massachusetts held an employee’s Title VII sex discrimination claim could 
survive a motion for summary judgment where the employee was subject to 
“constant” harassment which focused on his being homosexual.80  The 
district court found that the employee’s “[c]o-workers and supervisors 
discriminated against him because he failed to meet their gender stereotypes 
of what a man should look like, or act like.  
In so doing, they created an objectively hostile and abusive work 
environment in violation of Title VII.”81 The district court relied on Price 
Waterhouse and Rosa when it held that: “If an employer acts upon 
stereotypes about sexual roles in making employment decisions, or allows 
the use of these stereotypes in the creation of a hostile or abusive work 
environment, then the employer opens itself up to liability under Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.”82 
The broad interpretation of sex had been accepted at the time by the 
Massachusetts Superior Court in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits,83  which 
addressed whether a school policy which prevented a male student from 
dressing in attire typically associated with females was illegal sex 
discrimination. Also citing Price Waterhouse, the court held that the school’s 
policy constituted sex discrimination under Chapter 76, § 5 (the school 
attendance discrimination statute), because the school prevented the student 
                                                          
77 Id. at 215. 
78 Id. at 216 (citations omitted). 
79 Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002). 
80 183 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
81 Id. at 409. 
82 Id. 
83 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Oct. 
11, 2000). 
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from attending school in clothing associated with the female gender solely 
because the student was male.84 
Similarly, at the administrative level, the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination (“MCAD”) found that discrimination 
based on an individual’s transgender status was actionable under the 
Massachusetts unfair discrimination in employment statute, Chapter 151B, 
as “sex discrimination.”85  In proceedings before the MCAD, the employee, 
a transgender woman, alleged that her supervisor discriminated against her 
because of her sex. The employee alleged the supervisor had issued 
pretextual written warnings for insubordination and threatened her with 
termination after the employee complained about her supervisor’s harassing 
behavior towards her.86 
The MCAD, also citing Price Waterhouse, found that “[s]ex 
discrimination is a concept that is read broadly; in other words, illegal “sex 
discrimination” takes into account non-anatomical concepts, like gender.”87  
The MCAD ultimately held that “sex discrimination, as prohibited by 
chapter 151B, includes a prohibition against discrimination against 
transgender individuals.”88 
When applying the above analysis to the insurance context, the 
Division looked at whether excluding individuals with gender dysphoria 
from coverage for certain medical treatments would constitute 
discrimination based on stereotyped notions of appropriate gender behavior. 
Based on the reasoning in the above-referenced authority, the Division 
concluded that Massachusetts courts would follow the majority of courts that 
had found that a broad interpretation should be given to “sex discrimination.”  
Therefore, the Division determined that if an insurer refused to cover 
gender assignment-related medical treatment because the insured failed to 
conform to the insurer’s idea of how a man or woman should look and 
behave, then the insured would have been discriminated against based on 
their sex. Thus, if a health insurer denied to provide coverage for medically 
                                                          
84 Id. at *7 
85 See Millet v. Lutco, MCAD Docket No. 98 BEM 3695, 23 M.D.L.R. 
231 (Oct. 10, 2001), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/25/ 
millettvlutco-2001.pdf. 
86 See id. at 1. 
87 See id. at 2. 
88 See id. at 5. 
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necessary treatment based on an individual’s gender dysphoria then this 
would be considered prohibited sex discrimination under Massachusetts law. 
On the other hand, it’s possible that people with gender dysphoria 
would be excluded from coverage not because the insurer had antiquated 
notions of what is appropriate behavior, but because the insurer believed the 
medical treatment being sought by the insured was experimental. 
Hypothetically, an insurer could exclude experimental surgeries from 
coverage, to a male or female, and not base the exclusion on the individual’s 
sex. Such an explanation may constitute a valid reason for denying treatment. 
However, in this scenario the issue would be between the parties to address 
the legitimacy of the treatment, and not, as it is here, on whether a blanket 
exclusion of coverage relating to gender transition health care—where the 
same treatment is covered for other medically necessary reasons—would be 
a form of prohibited sex discrimination. 
Further support for the broad interpretation of sex discrimination 
was found at the time with two federal agencies which had addressed the 
issue. In 2012, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office 
for Civil Rights (“OCR”) had determined that “sex discrimination” is 
extended to claims of discrimination based on gender identity or failure to 
conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity.89  Likewise, 
in 2012, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had issued a 
formal ruling that gender identity discrimination is per se “sex 
discrimination.”90  In addressing the scope of sex discrimination, these two 
federal agencies both adopted a broad interpretation of “sex discrimination” 
and extended it to provide protection from discrimination to those 
individuals with gender dysphoria. 
The letter from Leon Rodriguez, Director of the OCR, to Maya 
Rupert, Federal Policy Director, National Center for Lesbian Rights, dated 
July 12, 2012 (the “Rodriguez Letter”), stated that under Federal law, gender 
identity was viewed as a protected class with respect to health care plans 
                                                          
89 See Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Director of Office of Civil Rights, 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), to Maya Rupert, 
Federal Policy Director, National Center for Lesbian Rights, dated July 12, 
2012, http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/08/101981113-
Response-on-LGBT-People-in-Sec-1557-in-the-Affordable-Care-Act-from 
-the-U-S-Dept-of-Health-and-Human-Services.pdf [hereinafter Rodriguez 
Letter]. 
90 See Macy v. Eric Holder, Atty General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, EEOC 
Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 24, 2012), http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/macy-v-holder_edited.pdf. 
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under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). For example, Director Rodriguez 
noted that Section 1557 of the ACA specifically prohibited discrimination in 
health care programs on the basis of gender identity, race, color, national 
origin, sex, sex stereotypes, age or disability.91 As such, health insurers, 
hospitals, the health insurance exchanges, and any other entities that received 
federal funds are covered by this law.92 
As noted in the Rodriguez Letter, discrimination against transgender 
people in federal health programs or health programs that receive federal 
funds is prohibited under the ACA. The letter also notes that the Obama 
Administration had interpreted existing non-discrimination law — including 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 — to mean that the sex-discrimination protections 
under the ACA also applied to transgender people:  
We agree that Section 1577′s sex discrimination prohibition extends 
to claims of discrimination based on gender identity or failure to 
conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity and 
will accept such complaints for investigation…. Section 1557 also 
prohibits sexual harassment and discrimination regardless of actual 
or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the individuals 
involved.93 
In the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
ruling in 2012 in Macy v. Eric Holder, the complainant, a transgender police 
detective in Phoenix, Arizona, had alleged employment discrimination in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC found that 
gender identity and transgender discrimination was per se “sex 
discrimination” under Title VII.94  The agency found that:  
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination proscribing gender 
discrimination, and not just discrimination on the basis of biological 
sex, is important. If Title VII proscribed only discrimination on the 
basis of biological sex, the only prohibited gender-based disparate 
treatment would be when an employer prefers a man over a woman, 
                                                          
91 Rodriguez Letter at 1. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 at 14. 
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or vice versa. But the statute’s protections sweep far broader than 
that, in part because the term “gender” encompasses not only a 
person’s biological sex but also the cultural and social aspects 
associated with masculinity and femininity.95 
The EEOC concluded its opinion by stating that “intentional 
discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is 
transgender is, by definition, discrimination “based on...sex” and such 
discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”96 
If the Division were to find persuasive the reasoning in Price 
Waterhouse, Smith, Rosa, Centola, Yunits, Macy and the Rodriguez Letter, 
then there were several Massachusetts statutes which prohibited sex 
discrimination in the business of insurance that might be found broad enough 
to encompass discrimination in health insurance coverage against persons 
with gender dysphoria. For example, Chapter 175, § 24A provides:  
No company authorized to issue policies of accident or sickness 
insurance, policies providing coverage against disability from injury 
or disease, or policies of life or endowment insurance shall refuse to 
issue such a policy or limit the coverages normally contained therein 
with respect to the risk of such loss solely because of the sex of the 
insured.97  
Therefore, excluding health insurance coverage for gender 
dysphoria-related treatment could be considered prohibited sex 
discrimination under existing Massachusetts law because it would be a 
limitation on coverage based “solely because of the sex of the insured.”98 
VI. TRANSITIONING TO A NEW VIEW 
As discussed above, at the beginning of 2014, the Division began to 
review Massachusetts’ laws, as well as federal law and the law of other 
states, to determine whether health insurance carriers should be prohibited 
from excluding from coverage appropriate medical treatment for persons 
with gender dysphoria. We learned that while there was no Massachusetts 
statute or regulation that specifically prohibited health insurance carriers 
                                                          
95 Id. at 6-7. 
96 Id. at 14 
97 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 24A (2018). 
98 Id. 
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from formally excluding coverage for persons with gender dysphoria for 
gender transition-related medical care including gender assignment surgery, 
hormone replacement therapy and other treatments, the Division did 
conclude that there were at least two possible bases for proscribing health 
insurers from excluding such coverage under their health plans.  
One such possible basis was that excluding coverage for medically-
necessary treatment for gender dysphoria would violate the Massachusetts 
unfair insurance practices law Chapter 176D. Making such a finding, 
however, would have required coming to the conclusion that individuals with 
gender dysphoria are of the “same class and of essentially the same hazard” 
as those without gender dysphoria. The Colorado Division of Insurance and 
the District of Columbia’s Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking 
had both come to this conclusion based upon their own unfair insurance 
practices laws.  
But in the case of Colorado, Colorado law defined “sexual 
orientation” as “a person’s orientation toward heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status or another person’s 
perception thereof” and this definition applied to the state’s unfair insurance 
practices law. With respect of the District of Columbia, the district’s unfair 
competition statute was different from that of Massachusetts’ statute in that 
the district’s statute expressly prohibited discrimination based on gender 
identity or expression, something that the Massachusetts unfair insurance 
practice statute did not do. As a result, the Division concluded that there 
wasn’t nearly as strong a case to be made in Massachusetts as in Colorado 
or the District of Columbia, because of the lack of any statutory law directly 
applying any protection for gender identity to the state’s unfair insurance 
practices law. 
Nevertheless, the Division did determine that there was a very strong 
argument to be made for precluding health insurers from excluding 
individuals with gender dysphoria from coverage for certain medically 
necessary treatments would be the state’s existing prohibition on “sex 
discrimination” in the provision of health insurance, based on stereotyped 
notions of appropriate gender behavior. In this regard, the Division would be 
following the lead of the majority of courts which had concluded that a broad 
interpretation should be given to the term “sex discrimination.”  
Under this analysis, if an insurer refused to cover medically 
necessary treatment because the insured failed to conform to the insurer’s 
idea of how a man or woman should look and behave, then the insured has 
been discriminated against based on his or her “sex.” Thus, the Division 
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concluded that denying medically necessary treatment based on an 
individual’s gender dysphoria, and formally excluding from coverage for 
persons with gender dysphoria, gender transition-related medical care 
including gender assignment surgery, hormone replacement therapy and 
other treatments, must be considered prohibited sex discrimination under 
Massachusetts law. 
In early June 2014, the Division came to the final conclusion that the 
denial of coverage by health insurance companies for gender transition-
related medical care including gender assignment surgery, hormone 
replacement therapy and other treatments based on an individual’s gender 
identity or gender dysphoria must be declared to be sex discrimination that 
was prohibited under Massachusetts law. As a result, Division issued its 
Bulletin 2014-03 on June 20, 2014.99 
VII. THE AFTERMATH 
As a result of the issuance of the Bulletin, the previous nearly 
uniform exclusion from coverage of gender identity or gender dysphoria-
related treatment by Massachusetts health plans became no longer 
permissible in the Commonwealth, as the Division determined that 
exclusions from coverage for gender transition-related medical care would 
no longer be allowed.100  Once the Bulletin was issued, the health plans in 
the state immediately complied with its directives, and began to work with 
advocacy groups and state agencies to ensure that not only would coverage 
be available for gender transition-related medical treatment, but also that 
guidelines were developed to determine medical necessity for gender 
reassignment surgery.101 
Since the issuance of the Division’s issuance of the Bulletin in 
Massachusetts in 2014, the insurance departments of several other states 
issued insurance bulletins or guidance on the application of anti-
discrimination laws to health insurance coverage for the treatment of gender 
dysphoria.102  The federal government was also moving ahead on the issue 
of protecting the rights of persons with gender dysphoria under federal law.  
                                                          
99 See Bulletin 2014-03. 
100 Id. at 3. 
101 See, e.g., MassHealth, Guidelines for Medical Necessity 
Determination for Gender Reassignment Surgery (Jan. 2, 2015), https:// 
www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/18/mg-genderreassignment.pdf. 
102 See generally HEALTH INS. COMM’R, BULL. No. 2015-3, at 3 n.9 
(2015) (noting that the Commissioner’s analysis was “similar, in part, to that 
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On December 18, 2014, following the lead of the EEOC in Macy 
and the Office of Civil Rights opinions as set forth in the Rodriguez Letter, 
United States Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) would be taking the position in litigation that the 
protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 extended to claims of 
discrimination based on an individual’s gender identity, including 
transgender status.103 Attorney General Holder issued a memorandum that 
informed all DOJ heads and United States Attorneys that the DOJ would no 
longer assert that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination based on sex 
excludes discrimination based on gender identity per se, including 
transgender discrimination, reversing a previous DOJ position.104 
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate in the 
employment of an individual “because of such individual’s…sex,” among 
other protected characteristics.” This important shift will ensure that the 
protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are extended to those who suffer 
discrimination based on gender identity, including transgender status,” said 
Attorney General Holder. “This will help to foster fair and consistent 
treatment for all claimants. And it reaffirms the Justice Department’s 
commitment to protecting the civil rights of all Americans.” 
Under the Trump Administration, the federal government adopted a 
new position with respect to the application of the country’s discrimination 
laws to gender identity. On October 7, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
issued a memorandum to all United States Attorneys and Heads of 
Department Components, entitled “Revised Treatment of Transgender 
Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
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Massachusetts in their Bulletin 2014-03”); N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 
Ins. Circular Letter No. 7 (Dec. 11, 2014); MINN. DEP’T OF COM. & MINN. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH, ADMIN. BULL. No. 2015-5 (2015); NEV. DEP’T OF BUS. 
& INDUSTRY, DIVISION OF INS., BULL. No. 15-002, 2015 (2015); Wash, 
Office of the Ins. Comm’r, Letter (June 25, 2014); PENN. DEP’T OF INS., 
BULL No. 16-762, (2016); MICH. DEP’T OF INS. & FIN. SERVS., BULL. No. 
2016-10-INS (2016); and MD. INS. ADMIN. BULL. No. 15-33 (2015). 
103 See Press Release No. 14-1429, United States Department of Justice, 
Office of Press Affairs (Dec. 18, 2014) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attor 
ney-general-holder-directs-department-include-gender-identity-under-sex- 
discrimination. 
104 Id. 
324 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol.25 
of 1964.”105 The Attorney General stated that “[a]lthough federal law, 
including Title VII, provides various protections to transgender individuals, 
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.”106  
In so stating, Attorney General Sessions further noted that in a December 15, 
2014, memorandum, former Attorney General Holder came to the opposite 
conclusion, namely, that Title VII does encompass such discrimination, 
based on his view that Title VII prohibits employers from taking into account 
“sex-based considerations.”107 
Attorney General Sessions further stated that, upon his review of the 
pertinent statutory and case law, he concluded that “Title VII’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination between men and women 
but does not encompass discrimination based on gender identity per se, 
including transgender status.”108 Because of his conclusion, he formally 
withdrew Attorney General Holder’s December 15, 2014, memorandum, and 
stated that the DOJ would henceforth adopt his conclusion in all pending and 
future matters.109 
Similarly, on February 22, 2017, the U.S. Departments of Education 
and Justice (the “Departments”) issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” that stated 
that the Departments were withdrawing the statements of policy and 
guidance reflected in two previously-issued guidance documents: the Letter 
to Emily Prince from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Policy, Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education 
dated January 7, 2015; and the “Dear Colleague Letter” on transgender 
students jointly issued by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Education dated May 13, 2016.110 
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The Departments noted that these guidance documents took the position 
that the prohibitions on discrimination “on the basis of sex” in Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and 
its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, required access to sex-
segregated facilities based on gender identity. 111In the February 22, 2017 
Dear Colleague letter, the Departments stated that they had decided to 
withdraw and rescind the above-referenced guidance documents “in order to 
further and more completely consider the legal issues involved,” and that 
“the Departments thus will not rely on the views expressed within them.”112  
On October 21, 2018, the New York Times reported that the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) had revealed in an 
internal memorandum the agency’s intention to narrow the legal definition 
of “sex” under Title IX.113  In the leaked memorandum that had been 
obtained by the New York Times, HHS urged government agencies 
enforcing Title IX - including the DOJ - to adopt a single, uniform definition 
of gender based “on a biological basis that is clear, grounded in science, 
objective and administrable, where “sex” meant only “a person’s status as 
male or female based on immutable biological traits identifiable by or before 
birth,” The HHS memorandum further stated that the sex “listed on a 
person’s birth certificate, as originally issued, shall constitute definitive 
proof of a person’s sex unless rebutted by reliable genetic evidence.” 
On March 7, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, in the case R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, held that discrimination against transgender 
people was barred by Title VII.114 The Court of Appeals started that “[i]t is 
analytically impossible to fire an employee based on that employee’s status 
as a transgender person without being motivated, at least in part, by the 
employee’s sex,” and “discrimination ‘because of sex’ inherently includes 
discrimination against employees because of a change in their sex.”115 
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R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari from the Third Circuit’s decision.116 
On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, 
limited to the following question: “Whether Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their status as 
transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U. S. 228 (1989).”117 Oral argument before the Supreme Court is scheduled 
for October 8, 2019.118 
CONCLUSION 
As noted previously in this Article, the Division, in determining that 
the denial of coverage by health insurance companies for gender transition-
related medical care including gender assignment surgery, hormone 
replacement therapy and other treatments based on an individual’s gender 
identity or gender dysphoria, was sex-based discrimination prohibited under 
Massachusetts law. The Division had relied in part upon the Obama 
Administration’s interpretation of existing non-discrimination law— 
including Title VII and Title IX—to mean that the sex-discrimination 
protections under the ACA also applied to transgender people. The Trump 
Administration has upended this interpretation and stated that it no longer 
views existing laws as extending “sex-discrimination” protections to 
transgender people. The Division’s conclusions nevertheless remain intact 
and persuasive. 
The Division, in transitioning to a new view as to what was 
considered to be prohibited sex discrimination in the provision of benefits 
under health insurance policies to transgender persons, also relied also upon 
the long-standing lead of the majority of federal and state courts here in 
Massachusetts in concluding that the term “sex discrimination” must be 
given a broad interpretation. This conclusion is supported by the recent 
action of the Massachusetts Legislature in extending additional protections 
to transgender persons, including the passage of legislation in 2016 to extend 
protections against discrimination for gender identity to any place of public 
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accommodation,119  and the actions of the people of Massachusetts in voting 
on November 6, 2018, in a ballot initiative to uphold this state law forbidding 
discrimination based on gender identity in public places.120 
To the extent that the Supreme Court does ultimately rule that the 
term “sex discrimination” under Title VII, and by extension, Title IX, does 
not include discrimination because of gender identity, in order to fully ensure 
that benefits under health insurance policies are not denied to transgender 
persons on account of their gender identity, the Massachusetts Legislature 
should consider amending Chapter 134 of the Acts of 2016121 to include 
specific protection for transgender persons with respect to health coverage. 
More work needs to be done to protect the rights of transgender 
persons in seeking their rightful benefits under health insurance policies. But 
a good start has been made here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 
making sure that carriers will no longer be able to discriminate against 
transgender individuals as they seek coverage for gender transition-related 
medical care. 
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